Education CV
Education
2022 - Present: PhD Candidate, Churchill College, University of Cambridge (funded by an Open-Oxford Cambridge AHRC DTP – Churchill College Studentship)
- PhD Fellow of the Cambridge Family Law Centre
2021 - 2022: LLM, Girton College, University of Cambridge (First Class)
- Wright Rogers Law Scholarship
- George Long Prize for Jurisprudence
- Girton College Prize for First Class performance on LLM
2014 - 2015: Legal Practice Course (LPC), BPP University (Distinction)
2013 - 2014: Graduate Diploma in Law (GDL), BPP University (Distinction)
2010 - 2012: BPhil in Philosophy, St Anne's College, University of Oxford (Distinction)
- Thesis title: 'Wittgenstein on the Nature of Philosophy'
- Other papers: Philosophy of Mind and Action, Wittgenstein, Plato
2006 - 2009: BA in Philosophy, Girton College, University of Cambridge (First Class with Distinction: "Starred First")
- Craig Taylor Prize (awarded by the Faculty of Philosophy) for best overall performance in Part II of the Philosophy Tripos
- Emily Davies Scholarship and Christina Barnard Prize (awarded by Girton College) for First Class performance in Part II of the Philosophy Tripos
- Sir Arthur Arnold Scholarship and Isabella Cranshaw Prize (awarded by Girton College) for First Class performance in Part IB of the Philosophy Tripos
- Rosalind, Lady Carlisle Scholarship and Jane Catherine Gamble Prize (awarded by Girton College) for First Class performance in Part IA of the Philosophy Tripos
Selected employment history
Before commencing the LLM I practised as a solicitor of England & Wales for just under six years. I specialised in divorce, financial remedies on relationship breakdown, proceedings under the Children Act, and domestic abuse proceedings under the Family Law Act 1996.
Fields of research
Family law, moral and political philosophy, jurisprudence and legal theory
Research centres and interest groups
Justifying Relational Obligations: A Liberal Theory of Financial Responsibility in Family Law
Summary
A characteristic feature of family law is its treatment of personal and familial connections as grounds for the imposition of financial obligations. For example, parents typically owe special obligations of financial support to their children by virtue of being parents, and spouses typically owe special obligations of financial support, provision, or property sharing by virtue of having married. I refer to such obligations as relational obligations.
The central aim of my dissertation is to develop and defend a normative theory of relational obligations. The theory identifies the circumstances under which it is permissible, impermissible, and mandatory for the state to impose schemes of relational obligations upon its citizens. In doing so, it specifies the kinds of personal and familial connections to which such obligations should properly attach, the content of those obligations, and the procedures by which they should be governed. The theory therefore provides a principled framework for evaluating the schemes of relational obligations found in existing systems of family law, and for assessing whether, and how, they ought to be reformed.
The dissertation also pursues a broader purpose. The theory of relational obligations I develop is thoroughgoingly liberal in character, and is rooted in the philosophical tradition most closely associated with John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. This orientation is significant because the commitments of liberal political theory are frequently regarded with scepticism by scholars of family law. In particular, it is often suggested that liberalism – with its concern for individual autonomy and self-determination – militates in favour of an objectionably minimalist approach to the legal regulation of personal and family life.
I contest that suggestion. I argue that, once properly construed, liberal principles in fact support a robust and interventionist scheme of family law that incorporates demanding and inflexible relational obligations across a wide range of contexts. In doing so, I therefore challenge an understanding of liberalism that is endorsed by many prominent family lawyers, and suggest a fresh approach to long-running debates in the field.
Supervisors
Professor Matthew Kramer
Dr Anna Heenan
Bluesky 
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