Cambridge Legal Theory Discussion Group (CLTDG): 'Practical Reasoning as Interpretation'

Speaker: Daniel Murata (Surrey)

Abstract: Ronald Dworkin claims that moral reasoning is interpretive reasoning, which can be understood (as I will try to elucidate) as a mode of theoretical reasoning. Dworkin seems to deny the distinction between theoretical reasoning (reasoning concerned with what is the truth about a given matter) with practical reasoning (reasoning about what one ought to do). Against this picture and drawing from Bernard Williams, I will argue that a proper understanding of the way we engage with reasons gives due weight to the conflicts we feel and to their emotional residues, notably regret. If the Williamsian criticisms of Dworkin are right, then this will have an impact in how we understand our own engagement with the law. I will lay out Dworkin’s argument that moral reasoning is interpretation and connect it to his understanding of law. Then I will proceed to the criticisms, drawing mostly from what Williams has said in Ethical Consistency, Moral Luck and In the Beginning was the Deed. The main takeaway will be that Dworkin’s interpretive theory misplaces the idea of regret. The reason for this is that Dworkin’s interpretive theory attributes more flexibility to the materials it interprets than they have. Because practical reasoning starts from whom we are (or so I will argue), the Dworkinian model ends up presenting interpretations that cannot be accepted by the concrete agents. The final section of the paper discusses the view I am putting forward in relation to our engagement with the law.

The Paper: https://bit.ly/murata23lt

The Zoom link: https://bit.ly/cltdg23lt3

Everyone is welcome to attend!

The Zoom link: https://bit.ly/cltdg2022mt4

The Paper: https://bit.ly/myarompaper

Abstract: It is a fundamental tenet of modern positivist thought that law guides the behavior of its subjects. It is also a longstanding commitment of positivism that coherence plays no part in a theory of law. This article argues that these two commitments are in tension. After clarifying the relevant conception of coherence for the discussion it tackles the more serious challenge for coherence theories: That they cannot be reconciled with the authoritative nature of law. By drawing on the complexity of guiding behavior, the article demonstrates that a minimal notion of coherence is necessary for any theory of authority. It is thus seen that positivism must either admit substantive coherence into its concept of law, or significantly water down its claims that the law guides the behavior of subjects.

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