Cambridge Legal Theory Discussion Group (CLTDG): 'Legal Perspectivalism and Legal Inferences'

Speakers: Angelo Ryu & Trenton Sewell (Oxford)

Abstract: Perspectivalism is a popular way to understand legal obligations. That there is a legal obligation, on this view, is equivalent to there being a moral obligation from the legal perspective. But it has recently come under attack. In a recent paper, Adam Perry argues that perspectivalism cannot account for mixed arguments. These arguments go from legal premises to a factual conclusion. Take, for instance, the premises (i) only those over 18 have a legal right to vote, and (ii) Sarah has a legal right to vote. Seemingly, we should be able to arrive at the valid conclusion that Sarah is over 18. Perry says perspectivalism cannot explain the validity of this conclusion. We show that it can. So his objection—that perspectivalism cannot make sense of an important feature of legal argumentation—fails. Along the way, our discussion reveals an important lesson: those who endorse perspectivalism must take care to ensure that all parts of a legal argument, both premises and conclusions, are true according to the legal perspective.

You can find the links to Angelo and Trenton’s paper and to the meeting below:

The Paper: https://bit.ly/cltdg-ryu_sewell-paper

The Zoom link: https://bit.ly/cltdg-lent24-1

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