Education CV
Education
2022 - Present: PhD Candidate, Churchill College, University of Cambridge (funded by an Open-Oxford Cambridge AHRC DTP – Churchill College Studentship)
- PhD Fellow of the Cambridge Family Law Centre
2021 - 2022: LLM, Girton College, University of Cambridge (First Class)
- Wright Rogers Law Scholarship
- George Long Prize for Jurisprudence
- Girton College Prize for First Class performance on LLM
2014 - 2015: Legal Practice Course (LPC), BPP University (Distinction)
2013 - 2014: Graduate Diploma in Law (GDL), BPP University (Distinction)
2010 - 2012: BPhil in Philosophy, St Anne's College, University of Oxford (Distinction)
- Thesis title: 'Wittgenstein on the Nature of Philosophy'
- Other papers: Philosophy of Mind and Action, Wittgenstein, Plato
2006 - 2009: BA in Philosophy, Girton College, University of Cambridge (First Class with Distinction: "Starred First")
- Craig Taylor Prize (awarded by the Faculty of Philosophy) for best overall performance in Part II of the Philosophy Tripos
- Emily Davies Scholarship and Christina Barnard Prize (awarded by Girton College) for First Class performance in Part II of the Philosophy Tripos
- Sir Arthur Arnold Scholarship and Isabella Cranshaw Prize (awarded by Girton College) for First Class performance in Part IB of the Philosophy Tripos
- Rosalind, Lady Carlisle Scholarship and Jane Catherine Gamble Prize (awarded by Girton College) for First Class performance in Part IA of the Philosophy Tripos
Selected employment history
Before commencing the LLM I practised as a solicitor of England & Wales for just under six years. I specialised in divorce, financial remedies on relationship breakdown, proceedings under the Children Act, and domestic abuse proceedings under the Family Law Act 1996.
Fields of research
Family law, moral and political philosophy, jurisprudence and legal theory
The Moral Structure of Family Law
Summary
Familial relationships appear to give rise to special moral obligations. If I am the parent to a given child C then I owe special moral obligations to C which go beyond obligations that I owe to children who are not related to me. Those special obligations appear to derive from the fact that I stand in a relationship of parenthood to child C.
Family law imposes legal obligations on persons by reference to familial relationships. If I am the parent of C then the family law of a given jurisdiction is likely to impose special legal obligations upon me in respect of C. Those legal obligations derive from the fact that the law classifies me as standing in a relationship of parenthood to C.
My research explores the nature of the relationship between these moral and legal obligations. Is there an important connection between them? Does family law lose legitimacy if it departs too radically from a plausible conception of familial moral obligations? Is it always desirable for the structure of family law to mirror the structure of morality? Where conceptions of familial moral obligations are in competition with each other, do they support competing conceptions of legal obligations within family law?
My contention is that by pursuing answers to these questions we can shed light on past, present and future developments within the field of family law.
Supervisors
Professor Claire Fenton-Glynn
Professor Matthew Kramer